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1. Introduction
The standard full-information non-cooperative bargaining model is due to the seminal work of
Rubinstein (1982). This model has been used widely in applications and has spawned a large body
of theoretical literature. Despite the popularity and importance of the Rubinstein model, there
have been few attempts to generalize the assumptions about the payo¤ set. I present a framework,
which allows to generalize these assumptions, and state the necessary and su¢ cient conditions on
the payo¤ set that guarantee that a unique equilibrium exists. The standard assumption is that
the payo¤ set is convex. This assumption restricts applications since many bargaining situations
involve non-convex payo¤ sets and players usually have no access to randomization devices so that
they cannot propose lotteries.
Example 1 Consider the provision of a public good. For example, consider two institutions that
organize a joint event and bargain about how much e¤ort each has to put forth or spouses who
bargain how to share the housework. Suppose that the public good yields a payo¤ of one, that the
total e¤ort that is necessary for provision is one, and that the disutility of e¤ort ei for player i is
p
ei. The payo¤ of player i is pi = 1 pei with e1+e2 = 1. Note that e¢ ciency requires that only
one player contributes to the public good. The payo¤ set is non-convex and the Pareto-frontier is
given by p2(p1) = 1 
p
2p1   p21 with p1 2 [0; 1].
Example 2 Non-convex payo¤ sets are common when players bargain over multi-dimensional
issues and the payo¤ is not continuous in some dimensions. Consider two rms which use di¤erent
technologies. Firms bargain about which technology is adopted as industry standard and about how
to split the market. Payo¤ is linear in market shares x. If the technology of rm i is adopted,
rm is payo¤ increases by 1. For simplicity, suppose that the second technology is more e¢ cient
and that payo¤s are p1 = 1+x1 and p2 = x2 if the technology of rm 1 is adopted and p1 = 1:4x1
and p2 = 1 + 1:4x2 if the technology of rm 2 is adopted. The payo¤ set is non-convex and the
Pareto-frontier is not continuous.
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Example 3 Consider a country that has defaulted and that now bargains with a bank about how
much of the debt is forgiven and how much has to be repaid. For sovereign debt, collateral is
usually negligible. Instead, the reputation of countries and banks a¤ect the decision to default. If
a bank has a reputation as a tough negotiator, countries have less incentives to default and the
expected future payo¤ of the bank is higher. Let the country be player 1 and the bank be player 2.
Suppose p1 =  x and p2 = x+ f(x) where x is the amount that is repaid and f captures the e¤ect
of the bargaining outcome on the banks reputation (i.e., on its future payo¤s) with f 0 > 0. If the
marginal e¤ect on the reputation is increasing (f 00 > 0), the payo¤ set is non-convex.
These examples are not covered by regular bargaining theory because the payo¤ sets are non-
convex. Theorem 1(i) shows that these bargaining games have a unique equilibrium. Example
3 shows that the payo¤ set can be non-convex although players bargain over money. Other
examples where the payo¤ set can be non-convex although side-payments are possible are players
with interdependent preferences (e.g. Lopomo and Ok (2001)) or situations where money and the
good in the original bargaining problem are strict complements.
While there exists an extensive literature that analyzes di¤erent o¤er structures (e.g., Perry and
Reny (1993), Binmore (1987a)), bargaining over multiple issues (e.g., Inderst (2000) and literature
cited therein) or when players can leave the negotiations (Ponsati and Sakovics (1998)), there have
been few attempts to generalize conditions on the payo¤ set that ensure uniqueness. Binmore
(1994) states a necessary condition for uniqueness of the equilibrium when the time between o¤ers
approaches zero. Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) show that for convex payo¤ sets the
equilibrium of the Rubinstein game converges to the Nash-bargaining solution (NBS) as the time
between o¤ers approaches zero (see also Binmore (1987b)). There is no obvious way to extend the
NBS to non-convex payo¤ sets. Conley and Wilkie (1996) use a geometric construction to dene an
extension of the NBS. Their extension selects a unique payo¤ combination that satises a desired
set of axioms. Conley and Wilkie (1995) propose a non-cooperative game that implements their
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extension. O¤ the equilibrium path, their game makes use of lotteries. However, this extension
is not supported by the equilibrium of the Rubinstein model. Herrero (1989) considers payo¤
sets with continuous and downward sloping Pareto frontiers and denes an extension of the NBS
using an axiomatic characterization. Depending on the payo¤ set, this extension can take on a
large number of values. As the time between o¤ers approaches zero, the set of equilibria of the
Rubinstein model converges to the set of extended Nash-solutions as dened by Herrero. I dene
the extension of the NBS as the set of payo¤ combinations that are the global maximizers of
the weighted product of the payo¤s. This extension is a subset of Herreros solution. To avoid
confusion, hereafter NBS refers to the set of global maximizers.
Section 2 introduces the model and summarizes the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for
uniqueness of the equilibrium if the time between o¤ers is constant. Section 3 states su¢ cient
conditions for uniqueness when the time between o¤ers is not constant. Section 4 discusses exten-
sions of the model.
2. Conditions for Uniqueness when the Time between O¤ers is Constant
Two players bargain over a set P 2 R2 of feasible payo¤ combinations. Players alternate in
proposing an allocation. The rst p 2 P which is proposed by one player and accepted by the other
is implemented and payo¤s are realized. Player 1 starts and makes the rst o¤er. Player 2 receives
this o¤er at4t. Player 2 chooses to either accept or reject the o¤er. If he accepts, the game is over
and payo¤s are realized; if he rejects, he makes a countero¤er to player 1. Player 1 receives this
o¤er at 24t and either accepts or makes a countero¤er and so on. Players discount future payo¤s
with interest rates 1; 2 > 0. Let i be the discount factor of player i, with i = e  i4t. A player
cannot be forced to agree, so players might disagree perpetually. In this case players receive a
payo¤ of zero. As usual, equilibrium existence requires that a player accepts if he is indi¤erent. I
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assume that P is closed and bounded and that there exists a p 2 P with p 0.1 The maximum
payo¤ which player i can obtain is pi = maxfpij(pi; pj) 2 P , p  0g. For pj 2 [0; pj ] dene ci with
ci(pj) = maxfpij(pi; p0j) 2 P with p0j  pjg (1)
The value ci(pj) is the maximum payo¤ player i can obtain if he o¤ers at least pj to player j.
The function ci is dened for all pj 2 [0; pj ]. Note that it is possible that there exists pj such that
(ci(pj); pi) =2 P .
I use iterated conditional dominance to prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium. To do so, I
dene for each player i acceptance and rejection levels ani and r
n
i which depend on the round of
elimination n. Let a1i = ipi and r
1
i = ici(a
1
j ). For n > 1, dene a
n
i and r
n
i recursively with
ani = ici(jcj(a
n 1
i )) (2)
rni = ici(jcj(r
n 1
i )) (3)
and let a1i and r
1
i be the limit of (a
n
i ) and (r
n
i ) as n ! 1. Note that (a1i ) and (r1i ) are xed
points of ici(jcj).
Lemma 1 For player i it is conditionally dominated to reject an o¤er that gives him a payo¤
greater than a1i and to accept an o¤er that gives him a payo¤ less than r
1
i .
All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Binmore et al. (1986) show for convex payo¤ sets that the equilibrium of the Rubinstein
bargaining game converges to the NBS as the time between o¤ers approaches zero. For convex
payo¤ sets, the NBS is the payo¤ combination that maximizes the product of the payo¤s. I extend
this denition to non-convex payo¤ sets. While originally proposed as a symmetric solution,
weights (which usually correspond to the playersinterest rates) were introduced to capture the
1 The vector inequalities are represented by , >, and .
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bargaining power of the players. Let 1; 2 denote the weights and let pN1 ; p
N
2 denote the NBS
where
(pN1 ; p
N
2 ) = argmax
p0; p2P
p1
2  p21
Below, I dene a collection P of payo¤ sets such that whenever P 2 P, the NBS is unique
and the Rubinstein bargaining game has a unique equilibrium. Most of the bargaining literature
imposes one of two restrictions: that the payo¤ set is convex (for non-cooperative bargaining)
or d-comprehensive (for cooperative bargaining). I follow a di¤erent approach. Instead of using
topological restictions, I dene a collection of payo¤ sets in terms of c1. Besides being the only
tractable way of describing the collection of all payo¤ sets for which the equilibrium is unique, this
approach has another advantage. In applications of bargaining theory it is not always straight-
forward to describe the payo¤ set. But c1 is usually easy to compute because it is derived from a
simple maximization problem.
Denition Given a bargaining game with constant time between o¤ers and discount factors
1; 2, let  =   ln 2ln 1 . For closed and bounded payo¤ sets P with ci right-continuous at zero, let
P be the collection of P with
P =

P jc1(p2) p2 is strictly quasiconcave
	
Besides containing all convex payo¤ sets, the collection P contains some non-convex payo¤ sets,
disconnected payo¤ sets, and payo¤ sets with discontinuous Pareto frontiers. The quasiconcavity
condition implies that c1 is not too convex. In fact, c1 being strictly -concave is su¢ cient (but
not necessary) to guarantee the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Theorem 1 (4t constant) (i) If P 2 P, the payo¤ of player one is the same under all
strategy proles that survive iterated conditional dominance. If P 2 P and c0+1 (p2) < 08p2 2
[2p
N
2 ; p
N
2 ), a unique strategy prole survives iterated conditional dominance.
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(ii) If P 2 P , then as 4t ! 0 a unique strategy prole survives iterated conditional
dominance and equilibrium payo¤s are given by the Nash bargaining solution.
(iii) As 4t! 0, a unique strategy proles survives iterated conditional dominance if and only
if P 2 P.
Shaked and Sutton (1984) develop a simple method to compute the equilibrium in the Rubin-
stein bargaining game when the Pareto frontier is linear. When the SPNE is stationary, player 1
makes the same o¤er in every odd period. Let M be the payo¤ of player 1 if 2 accepts. Therefore,
2 o¤ers in every even period M to 1 and gets the remaining payo¤. Hence, 1 o¤ers in odd periods
the discounted payo¤ 2 would get when 2s o¤er would be accepted. The remaining payo¤ for 1
if 2 accepts is equal to M . The equilibrium is unique whenever there is a unique M that satises
this relation which is true i¤ 2c2(1c1) has a unique xed point. Since this proof relies on the
stationarity of the equilibrium, it cannot be used when the time between o¤ers is not constant
even when the Pareto-frontier is linear.
3. Uniqueness when the Time between O¤ers is not Constant
In many circumstances under which people bargain, the time between o¤ers is not constant.
For example, consider boards that have to approve o¤ers but that do not meet at night or on
holidays. In applications, constant time between o¤ers is a convenient assumption, especially if it
allows to compute explicit payo¤s. However, to justify this assumption, it is necessary to know
under which conditions a unique equilibrium exists when the time between o¤ers is not constant.
Let 4t be the lenght of period t, i.e. 4t is the di¤erence between the time when the t-th o¤er
is received and the time when it is made by the other player. Let ti be the corresponding discount
factor with ti = e
  i4t . When the time between o¤ers is not constant, dene for all t; t+ 1 with
t even the NBS:
pN2 = argmax
p0; p2P
c1(p2)
ln t2
ln 
t+1
1  p2 and pN1 = c1(pN2 )
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For t even, let pN
2
= min

t2p
N
2
	
and pN2 = max

pN2
	
and let  = min
n
  ln t2
ln t+11
o
and  =
max
n
  ln t2
ln t+11
o
.
Theorem 2 (4t not constant) Let P 2 P 8 2 [; ] and suppose there exists " > 0 such
that c1 is strictly -concave for all p 2
h
pN
2
  "; pN2 + "
i
. Then there exists a unique strategy
prole that survives iterated conditional dominance.
When the time between o¤ers is not constant, it is possible to provide limits for the equilibrium
payo¤s but not to compute explicit equlibrium payo¤s. As4t! 0 the equilibrium payo¤ of player
1 is in the interval [mint pN1 ; maxt p
N
1 ] and similar for player 2.
4. Generalizations
In many situations, players receive some income ow or incur some cost during the bargaining
(e.g. strike pay, cost of negotiations). Furthermore, players do not always know when the other
player will receive the o¤er or when the other player will be able to respond. In this case, the
time between o¤ers is random. Additonally, in many situations it is possible that the bargaining
opportunity disappears or that the bargaining process breaks down.
In this section, I generalize the Rubinstein bargaining model to account for these possibilities.
The analysis of bargaining games with income ows and the possibility of a breakdown is not new
(see Muthoo (1999) for a detailed overview). When the time between o¤ers is constant, one can use
the fact that the equilibrium is stationary and the computation of the equilibrium is essentially the
same as when income ows and breakdown payo¤s are zero. Instead of following this approach,
I develop a new technique. Specically, I show that income ows and breakdown payo¤s can
be normalized to zero. That means that there exists a bargaining game without income ows or
breakdown payo¤s that is equivalent (in terms of strategies and payo¤s) to the original game. This
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technique allows to analyze bargaining games with income ows and breakdown payo¤s when the
time between o¤ers is not constant.
Except for the additional features, the model is the same as the alternating o¤er model pre-
sented above. Player 1 starts by making the rst o¤er at time t1. Player 2 receives this o¤er at
t1 + 1, where  is the realization of a random variable which captures delays in the transmission
of the o¤er. At t2 = t1 + 1 player 2 chooses to either accept or reject the o¤er. If he rejects,
he makes a countero¤er, where player 1 receives this o¤er at t2 + 2 and so on. The delay k is
drawn from the distribution function Hk with density hk. I assume that the expected value of k
is positive. During one unit of time the bargaining process breaks down with probability 1   .
In this case, both players get their breakdown payo¤s b1 and b2. The expected payo¤ for player i
from the breakdown of the bargaining between tk and tk + k is:
bki =
Z 1
0
Z t
0
  ln  zbie  izdz hk(t)dt
where z is the probability that the bargaining did not break down between time tk and tk+z and
  ln is the instantaneous probability of a breakdown. During the bargaining process, players
receive an income ow 1 and 2. The expected payo¤ of player i from the income ow between
tk and tk + k discounted to tk is:
ki =
Z 1
0
tie
  it(1 Hk(t))dt
The expected payo¤ of a player is the sum of his expected payo¤s from the income ow, the
breakdown payo¤ and the implemented o¤er p. If players disagree forever, they receive  as long
as the bargaining process does not break down plus b when the bargaining breaks down. Let si
denote the expected disagreement payo¤ of player i:
si =
i   ln  bi
 i   ln
I assume that there exists a p 2 P with p  s. If player i o¤ers p at time ts to player j the
expression the payo¤ of j from prefers to the payo¤ player j gets at ts+1 from accepting p but
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does not include earlier income ows. For pj 2 [sj ; pj ] dene ci with ci(pj) = maxfpij(pi; p0j) 2 P
with p0j  pjg. Let ki be discounted value of an o¤er of 1 in period k when income ow and
breakdown payo¤s are not taken into account, i.e. ki =
R1
0
te  ithk(t)dt. The discount factor
consists of two terms, the usual discounting term e t, and the probability t that the bargaining
process does not break down before t. The discount factor captures the two motives to reach an
agreement: impatience and the fear that the bargaining opportunity might disappear. Similar
to the case when breakdown payo¤s and income ows are zero, I dene acceptance and rejection
levels which depend on the round of elimination:
ani = 
1
i ci(
2
jcj(a
n 1
i ) + 
2
j + b
2
j ) + 
1
i + b
1
i
rni = 
1
i ci(
2
jcj(r
n 1
i ) + 
2
j + b
2
j ) + 
1
i + b
1
i
When income ows or breakdown payo¤s are non-zero, the expressions for ani ; r
n
i are cumbersome
for proving uniqueness. To normalize  and b, let P s = f(pi   si; pj   sj) jp 2 Pg and dene
csi (uj) = ci(uj + sj)  si
csj(ui) = cj(ui + si)  sj
where the superscript s indicates the normalized expessions. Note that csj : [0; pi si]! [0; pj sj ]
and similar for csi . For a given sequence of distribution functions Hk and given interest rates 1
and 2, let  (P; ; b) be the bargaining game with payo¤ set P , income ow , and breakdown
payo¤ b. Strategies can be described by a cut-o¤ payo¤ such that a player accepts or rejects an
o¤er and by the payo¤ that a player o¤ers to the other player. Given  (P; ; b), let f( (P; ; b))
be the set of strategies that survive iterated conditional dominance. Lemma 2 shows that it is
possible to normalize income ows and breakdown payo¤s to zero and that it is su¢ cient to prove
uniqueness and to compute equilibrium strategies for the simpler game where  = b = 0.
Lemma 2 If 4t is constant and P s 2 P, then f( (P; ; b)) = f( (P s; 0; 0))+ s. For 4t not
constant, if P s 2 P 8 2 [; ] and if there exists " > 0 such that c1 is strictly -concave for all
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p 2
h
pN
2
  "; pN2 + "
i
, then f( (P; ; b)) = f( (P s; 0; 0)) + s.
Note that payo¤ set and the functions c1; c2 are normalized but that discount factors in
 (P s; 0; 0) are the same as in  (P; ; b).
5. Conclusions
This paper generalizes the assumptions about the payo¤ set in the Rubinstein bargaining
model and gives necessary and su¢ cient conditions for uniqueness. The normalization technique
makes it possible to analyze games with income ows and breakdowns when the time between
o¤ers is not constant. This is technique should also prove useful for other questions since it allows
to analyze bargaining games where the payo¤ set changes over time.
6. Appendix
Lemma 1 For player i it is conditionally dominated to reject an o¤er that gives him a payo¤
greater than a1i and to accept an o¤er that gives him a payo¤ less than r
1
i .
Proof. Since zero is the minimax payo¤, it is strictly dominated to accept an o¤er which
yields less than zero. Player 1 makes the rst o¤er. The discounted maximum payo¤ that player
2 can obtain when he rejects the o¤er is 2p2. Hence, for player 2 it is conditionally dominated
to reject an o¤er where p2 > a12 = 2p2 where the superscript in a
1
2 refers to the rst round of
elimination. Similar, it is conditionally dominated for player 2 to accept an o¤er which yields
him less than r12 = 2c2(a
1
1), because this is the amount he can gain for sure by o¤ering a
1
1 in the
next period to player 1. Therefore, player 1 will o¤er at least r12. By assumption pi > 0 so that
a1i < pi. But then r
1
i  0. Similarly, if player 2 rejects the o¤er of player 1 he would have to o¤er
at least r11 at time t2. Therefore, it is conditionally dominated for player 2 to reject an o¤er where
p2 > a
2
2 = 2c2(r
1
1) where 2c2(r
1
1) = 2c2(1c1(a
1
2)), and so on. For n > 1, the expressions for
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ani and r
n
i can be written recursively with a
n
i = ici(jcj(a
n 1
i )) and r
n
i = ici(jcj(r
n 1
i )). Note
that a1i  r1i . Since cj is weakly decreasing we have a2j  r2j . From induction follows that ani  rni
for all n > 0. Since (ani ) and (r
n
i ) are monotone, we have a
n
i  rki 8n; k. The sequences (ani ) and
(rni ) are monotone and their range is a subset of [0; pi]. Therefore, (a
n
i ) and (r
n
i ) converge and the
limits a1i and r
1
i exist. Hence, for player i it is conditionally dominated to reject an o¤er that
yields more a1i or to reject an o¤er that yields less than r
1
i .
Before I prove Theorem 1, I introduce two denitions that are used in the proofs. To show
that the function 1c1(2c2) has a unique xed point and that (an2 ) and (r
n
2 ) converge to the xed
point, I dene a function v such that every point in the domain of v is a xed point of 1v 1(2v).
The function v is exactly -concave with  =   ln 2ln 1 .
Denition Let x = x1 + (1  )x2. A positive-valued function g with convex domain X is
-concave for  6= 0 and jj <1 if 8x1; x2 2 X and  2 (0; 1)
g(x)  (g(x1) + (1  )g(x2))
1

The function g is strictly -concave (exactly -concave) if the inequality holds strictly (with
equality).
Denition Given 0 < 1; 2 < 1, let V be the family of all v : R+nf0g ! R+nf0g with
 > 0 and
v(x) =
x

  ln 1ln 2
Note that 2v 1 (1v(x)) = x, that v is exactly -concave, and that [v(x)]
   x = .
Theorem 1 (4t constant) (i) If P 2 P, the payo¤ of player one is the same under all
strategy proles that survive iterated conditional dominance. If P 2 P and c0+1 (p2) < 08p2 2
[2p
N
2 ; p
N
2 ), a unique strategy prole survives iterated conditional dominance.
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(ii) If P 2 P , then as 4t ! 0 a unique strategy prole survives iterated conditional
dominance and equilibrium payo¤s are given by the Nash bargaining solution.
(iii) As 4t! 0, a unique strategy proles survives iterated conditional dominance if and only
if P 2 P.
Proof. (i) The function 2c2(1c1) : [0; p2]  ! [0; p2] is non-decreasing. From Tarskis xed
point theorem follows that 2c2(1c1) has at least one xed point. If P 2 P, the function
c1(p2)
 p2 is strictly quasiconcave. Since [v(p)]   p = , all v 2 V intersect c1 at most
twice. Let pf be an arbitrary xed point of 2c2(1c1). Note that P 2 P implies that ci is
right-continuous at zero and, therefore, ci(jpj) > 0. Hence, 2c2(1c1(0)) > 0 and pf > 0.
The range of c2 is a subset of [0; p2]. Hence, pf  2p2. Recall that v : R+nf0g ! R+nf0g.
Since 2v 1 (1v(p)) = p and c1(2p2) > 0 we know that for any xed point pf of 2c2(1c1) 9
s.t. v(pf ) = c1(pf ) and v

pf
2

= 1c1 (pf ). Strict quasiconcavity of c1(p2) p2 implies that
v(p) < c1(p)8p 2 (pf ; pf2 ). Let  = max fj9p with c1(p) = v(p)g. Since c1(p2) p2 is strictly
quasiconcave and since [v(p)]   p = , there exists a unique bp such that c1(bp) = v(bp) with
c1(p) < v(p) 8p 6= bp. Thus bp = argmax c1(p2) p2. From the denition of NBS follows bp = pN2 .
For an arbitrary  < , let pa = min fpjv(pa) = c1(pa)g. By construction, c1 is weakly
decreasing. Therefore, P 2 P implies that c1 is continuous for p < bp. Since c1(0) = p1 and
lim
p!0
v(p) = 1, for every  2 (0; ) exists a unique pa with pa < bp. Given , let pb denote the
unique p  bp s.t. c 1 (pb)  v(pb)  c+1 (pb). Since P is closed, from the denition of c1 follows
that c 1 (pb) = c1(pb). Note that v(p) < c1(p) for p 2 (pa, pb) and v(p) > c1(p) for p =2 [pa, pb].
Strict quasiconcavity of c1(p2) p2 implies that pa is strictly increasing in  while pb is weakly
decreasing. Hence there exists a unique f such that for pa and pb that are dened by f it is
true that pa = 2pb. I show next that the pa that is dened by f is the unique xed point of
2c2 (1c1).
Let epf and epf2 denote the unique pa and pb where pa = 2pb. From 2v 1 (1v(p)) = p follows
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that 1v(epf ) = v  epf2 . From vf (epf ) = c1(epf ) follows that 1c1(epf ) = vf  epf2 . Recall that
c1(p2)
 p2 is strictly quasiconcave and that pb  bp, i.e. epf2  bp. There are two cases:
Case I: c1
 epf
2

= vf
 epf
2

and c01
 epf
2

< 0.
Since c01
 epf
2

< 0 there exists no p2 >
epf
2
and p1  c1
 epf
2

with (p1; p2) 2 P . Thus 1c1(epf ) =
vf
 epf
2

, c1
 epf
2

= vf
 epf
2

, and c01
 epf
2

< 0 imply that c2 (1c1(epf )) = v 1 (1v(epf )) = epf2 .
Case II: c1
 epf
2

 vf
 epf
2

 c+1
 epf
2

.
Strict quasiconcavity of c1(p2) p2 implies that c1 is strictly decreasing for all p  bp. Since
epf
2
 bp, there exists no p2 > epf2 and p1  c+1  epf2  such that (p1; p2) 2 P . Hence, for all
p 2
h
c+1
 epf
2

; c1
 epf
2
i
we have c2(p) =
epf
2
. Thus 1c1(epf ) = vf  epf2  implies c2 (1c1(epf )) = epf2 .
In both cases 2c2 (1c1(epf )) = epf and, therefore, epf = pf , i.e., epf is the unique xed point
of 2c2(1c1). From pf < bp  pf2 and bp = pN2 follows that pf 2 [2pN2 ; pN2 ). Since 2c2(1c1) is
non-decreasing and has a unique xed point pf we have 2c2(1c1(p)) > p for 0  p < pf and
2c2(1c1(p)) < p for pf < p  p2. Hence (rn2 ) and (an2 ) converge to pf . Note that rn1 = 1c1(an2 )
and an1 = 1c1(r
n 1
2 ). Hence, (r
n
1 ) and (a
n
1 ) converge to 1c1(pf ).
From Lemma 1 follows that it is conditionally dominated for player 2 to reject (accept) an o¤er
where p2 > pf (p2 < pf ). Therefore, it is conditionally dominated for player 1 to accept (reject) an
o¤er where p1 < 1c1(pf ) (p1 > 1c1(pf )). Hence, it is conditionally dominated for player 2 to o¤er
p1 < 1c1(pf ) or p1 such that c2(p1) < c2(1c1(pf )). Additionally, it is conditionally dominated
for player 1 to o¤er p2 < pf or p2 such that c1(p2) < c1(pf ). Since ci is weakly decreasing, this
implies that in all equilibria, the payo¤ of player 1 is c1(pf ). Since pf 2 [2pN2 ; pN2 ), the condition
that c0+1 < 08p2 2 [2pN2 ; pN2 ) ensures that c0+1 (pf ) < 0, i.e. there is a trade-o¤ between the payo¤
of player 1 and 2. Therefore, the equilibrium is unique if c0+1 < 08p2 2 [2pN2 ; pN2 ).
(ii) Convergence to NBS:
Note that  does not depend on 4t. Let pf (4t) be the xed point of 2c2(1c1) as a function
of 4t. Since pf 2 [2pN2 ; pN2 ), we have lim4t!0pf (4t) = p
N
2 . Since p
N
2 is the unique maximizer
of c1(p2) p2, either c01(p
N
2 ) < 0 or c1(p
N
2 ) > c
+
1 (p
N
2 ). Hence, in the limit as 4t ! 0, there
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exists a unique p = pN2 such that c1(p)  c1(pN2 ) and p  pN2 . Therefore, as 4t ! 0, we
have r1i = a
1
i = p
N
2 and from Lemma 1 follows that a unique strategy prole survives iterated
conditional dominance and that equilibrium payo¤s are given by the NBS.
(iii) In part (ii), I have shown that in the limit as4t! 0 the equilibrium converges to the NBS,
i.e. that the equilibrium is unique. It remains to show that as 4t! 0 at least two equilibria exist
if P =2 P. The set of subgame perfect Nash-equilibria (SPNE) is a subset of the set of strategy
proles that survive iterated conditional dominance. Therefore, it is su¢ cient to show that at least
two SPNE exist if P =2 P. I show rst that at least two SPNE exist if ci is not right-continuous
at zero and then that at least two SPNE exist if c1(p2) p2 is not strictly quasiconcave.
If ci is not right-continuous at zero, then ci(0) > c
+
i (0) where ci(0) = pi. At least two SPNE
exist. In the rst SPNE, player i o¤ers 0 and rejects any o¤er that yields him less than pi. Player
j o¤ers pi and accepts any o¤er. In the second SPNE corresponds to the NBS.
If c1(p2) p2 is not strictly quasiconcave, there are two possible cases.
Case 1: There exists an  and an interval I s.t. c1(p) = v(p) 8p 2 I.
Let a = inf I and b = sup I. Since v is continuous and strictly decreasing, from c1(p) = v(p)
8p 2 I follows that c1 is continuous and strictly decreasing on (a; b]. Hence c2 is continuous
on (1c1(b); 1c1(a)] (Note that this is true regardless of c1 being continuous at a). Rewrite
c1(p) = v(p) as c1(a + ") = v(a + ") 8" 2 (0; b   a]. Dene 4t such that a = b  e 24t, i.e.,
4t =   12 ln
 
a
b

. For all 4t < 4t exist " > 0 and   0 such that 1c1(a+ ") = v(b  ). Since
a + " is by construction of v a xed point of 2v 1(1v) it follows that a + " is a xed point of
2c2(1c1) if 4t < 4t. Therefore, for all 4t < 4t e" with e" 2 (0;4t), the function 2c2(1c1(p))
has a continuum of xed points in the interval (a; b). Let pf1 and pf2 denote two xed points of
2c2(1c1) with pf1 6= pf2. For 4t < 4t e" there exists a continuum of SPNE where each SPNE
corresponds to a xed point. Note that 4t > 0 if a < b. As 4t! 0, the minimum lenght of I such
that a continuum of xed points exists, goes to zero. Hence, as 4t! 0, a continuum of equilibria
exist whenever a < b, i.e., whenever c1(p2) p2 is quasiconcave but not strictly quasiconcave.
14
Case 2: There exists an interval A such that 8v with  2 A exist at least two disjoint intervals
I1 and I2 such that c1(p)  v(p) if and only if p 2
S
I.
For an arbitrary e 2 A, let a1 = inf I1 and b1 = sup I1 and dene a2 and b2 analogously.
Let 4t1 =   12 ln

a1
b1

and 4t2 =   12 ln

a2
b2

and let 4t = min4t1, 4t2	. Similar to the
argument in part (i), for 4t  4t and corresponding 1, 2 exist 1, 2  e and (pa1; pb1) 2
[a1; b1]
2 with pa1 = 2pb1 such that c1(pa1) = v1(pa1) and c1(pb1)  v1(pb1)  c+1 (pb1) and
similar for pa2; pb2. By the same argument as in part (i), there exist pf1 2 [a1; b1) and pf2 2 [a2; b2)
such that pf1 and pf2 are xed points of 2c2(1c1). Whenever c1(p2) p2 is not quasiconcave,
there exists e > 0 and intervals I1 and I2 such that4t > 0. Hence, in the limit as4t! 0, at least
two xed points pf1 and pf2 exist. Therefore, whenever c1(p2) p2 is not quasiconcave, at least
two SPNE exist: player 1 o¤ers pf1 (pf2) and rejects any o¤er less than 1c1(pf1) (1c1(pf2)) and
accepts otherwise. Player 2 o¤ers 1c1(pf1) (1c1(pf2)) and rejects any o¤er less than pf1 (pf2)
and accepts otherwise.
The following technical Lemma about -concave functions is needed to prove Theorem 2.
Lemma A1 (i) Let x1 6= x2 and y1; y2 > 0 be given. For all  6= 0, jj < 1, there exists a
unique exactly -concave function g with g(x) = (dx+ k)
1
 such that g(x1) = y1 and g(x2) = y2.
(ii) If g is exactly -concave and g is not constant, then the inverse g 1 exists. If g is
exactly -concave with g(x) = (dx + k)
1
 and  =   ln 2ln 1 and inverse g 1, then 2g 1(1g(x)) =
x+ kd (1  2).
(iii) Let 0 < . If f is -concave, f is also 0-concave. If g is exactly -concave and f is
strictly -concave and if there exists x1; x2 with x1 < x2 and g(x1) = f(x1) and g(x2) = f(x2),
then g(x) < f(x)8x 2 (x1; x2) and g(x) > f(x)8x =2 [x1; x2].
(iv) If g1 and g2 are exactly -concave and if there exists x1 < x1 such that g1(x1) = g2(x1)
and g1(x2) < g2(x2), then g1(x) > g2(x)8x < x1 and g1(x) < g2(x)8x > x1.
(v) Let g1 and g2 be exactly -concave and strictly decreasing functions with  < 0 and gi =
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(dix+ ki)
1
 for i 2 f1; 2g. If there exists xr < xc such that g1(xc) = g2(xc) and g1(xr) < g2(xr),
then there exists 4 > 0 such that k1d1 > k2d2 +4.
Note that if g is exactly (strictly) -concave, then g is a¢ ne (strictly concave).
Theorem 2 (4t not constant) Let P 2 P 8 2 [; ] and suppose there exists " > 0 such
that c1 is strictly -concave for all p 2
h
pN
2
  "; pN2 + "
i
. Then there exists a unique strategy
prole that survives iterated conditional dominance.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1(i), I show that (rn2 ) and (a
n
2 ) converge to the same
limit. As shown in the proof of Theorem 1(i), whenever P 2 P, the function 2c2(1c1) has a
unique xed point pf 2 [2pN2 ; pN2 ). Note that pf is a function of the discount factors. Since
pf 2 [2pN2 ; pN2 ) and since P 2 P 8 2 [; ], for all t even, the xed point of t2c2(t+11 c1) lies in
the interval
h
pN
2
; pN2

. Furthermore, as shown in the proof of Theorem 1(i), 2c2(1c1(p)) > p for
0  p < pf and 2c2(1c1(p)) < p for pf < p  p2. Since P 2 P 8 2 [; ], for every " > 0 there
exists an n such that rn2 2
h
pN
2
  "; pN2 + "
i
and an2 2
h
pN
2
  "; pN2 + "
i
. Theorem 2 requires that
there exists " > 0 such that c1 is strictly -concave for all p 2
h
pN
2
  "; pN2 + "
i
. With a slight
abuse of notation, let I" be the largest interval
h
pN
2
  "; pN2 + "
i
such that c1 is strictly -concave
for all p 2 I". Since there exists n such that rn2 2 I" and an2 2 I", it is su¢ cient to show that the
sequences (rn2 ) and (a
n
2 ) converge to the same limit given that r
n
2 2 I" and an2 2 I". Hence, for
rest of the proof, I restrict attention to the case where rn2 2 I" and an2 2 I".
Recall that rn+12 = 
2
2c2(
3
1c1(
4
2c2(
5
1c1(r
n 2
2 )))) and so on, and that  =   ln 
t
2
ln t+11
. Therefore,
we need to show that for all t2; 
t+1
1 with t even and  2 [; ] we have an+12   rn+12 < an2   rn2
where an+12 = 
t
2c2(
t+1
1 c1(a
n
2 )) and similar for r
n+1
2 . To simplify notation, I suppress the time
indices of the discount factors. The parameter  corresponds to the t2; 
t+1
1 under consideration.
As shown in the proof of Lemma 1, ani  rki 8n; k. If rn2 = an2 then a12 = r12 and we are
done. If rn2 = pf and a
n
2 > pf , then r
n+1
2 = r
n
2 and a
n+1
2 < a
n
2 (where a
n+1
2 < a
n
2 follows from
16
2c2(1c1(0)) > 0, and 2c2(1c1(p))  2p2, and the fact that 2c2(1c1) is increasing and has a
unique xed point). Hence, if rn2 = pf and a
n
2 > pf , we have a
n+1
2   rn+12 < an2   rn2 . Similarly, if
an2 = pf and r
n
2 < pf , we have r
n+1
2 > r
n
2 and a
n+1
2   rn+12 < an2   rn2 . Note that pf depends on
the discount factors. Given some rn2 , a
n
2 it is possible that there exists some t and 
t
2, 
t+1
1 and
corresponding xed point pf such that rn2 < a
n
2 < pf or pf < r
n
2 < a
n
2 . Therefore, it remains to
show that an+12   rn+12 < an2   rn2 if rn2 2 I", an2 2 I" and if rn2 < an2 < pf (Case I) or pf < rn2 < an2
(Case II).
For rn2 ; a
n
2 2 I" follows from Lemma A1(i) that there exist unique dr and kr that dene an
exact -concave function gr with gr(p) = (drp+ kr)
1
 such that gr(rn2 ) = c1(r
n
2 ) and gr

rn+12
2

=
c1

rn+12
2

. Dene ga in the same way such that ga intersects c1 at an2 and
an+12
2
. Since c1 is
weakly decreasing and strictly -concave for all p 2 I", c1 is continuous and strictly decreasing
for all p 2 I". Therefore, for p 2 I", c2 is the inverse of c1 and c2 is strictly decreasing for
p 2 [c1 (min I") ; c1 (max I")]. Since rn2 2 I" we have c2(c1(rn2 )) = rn2 and c2(1c1(rn2 )) > rn2 . From
rn+12 = 2c2(1c1(r
n
2 )) follows that r
n
2 <
rn+12
2
and, similarly, an2 <
an+12
2
. Since c1 is strictly
decreasing for all p 2 I" and c1(p2) p2 is strictly quasiconcave and pN2 > argmax c1(p2) p2, we
have c1 strictly decreasing for all p  min I". Hence rn2 < r
n+1
2
2
implies that gr(rn2 ) > gr

rn+12
2

and, similarly, ga(an2 ) > ga

an+12
2

. Since rn2 < a
n
2 , we have
rn+12
2
<
an+12
2
. Since c1 is strictly
decreasing for p  min I", we know that gr and ga are strictly decreasing. Since g(p) = (dp+ k) 1
with  < 0, this implies that dr > 0 and da > 0. Since rn2 <
rn+12
2
, from Lemma A1(iii) follows
that gr(p) < c1(p)8p 2

rn2 ;
rn+12
2

and that gr(p) > c1(p)8p =2
h
rn2 ;
rn+12
2
i
and similar for ga. Since
rn2 < a
n
2 we have ga(r
n
2 ) > c1(r
n
2 ) and, therefore, ga(r
n
2 ) > gr(r
n
2 ). Similarly, since
rn+12
2
<
an+12
2
we
have gr(
an+12
2
) > ga(
an+12
2
). Since g is exactly -concave, g is continuous. Therefore, there exists
a unique pc 2

rn2 ;
an+12
2

such that gr(pc) = ga(pc). Hence, gr(p) < ga(p) for all p  rn2 and
gr(p) > ga(p) for all p  a
n+1
2
2
.
Case I: rn2 < a
n
2 < pf
As shown in the proof of Theorem 1(i), for a xed point pf of 2c2(1c1) there exists f such
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that vf (pf ) = c1(pf ) and c1

pf
2

 vf

pf
2

 c+1

pf
2

. Dene a such that va(a
n
2 ) = ga(a
n
2 )
where ga(an2 ) = c1(a
n
2 ). Recall that bp = argmax c1(p2) p2. Note that c1(p2) p2 is strictly
quasiconcave, that v(p)   p = , that (by assumption) an2 < pf , and (as shown in proof of
Theorem 1(i)) that pf < bp. Hence c1(an2 )   an2 < c1(pf )   pf . Hence, there exists a unique
ep > pf2 such that c1 (ep)  va (ep)  c+1 (ep). Since an2 < pf we have an+122 < pf2 and, therefore,
an+12
2
< ep. From Lemma A1(iii) follows that ga (ep) > ci (ep) and, therefore, ga (ep) > va (ep). From
Lemma A1(iv) follows that ga (p) > va (p)8p > an2 and ga (p) < va (p)8p < an2 . Recall that
va(p) =

p
a
 1

which can be written as va(p) = (dvp+ kv)
1
 where kv = 0. Applying Lemma
A1(v) where ga corresponds to g1 and va corresponds to g2 gives
ka
da
> 0.
Case II: pf < rn2 < a
n
2
The argument is similar to Case I. Dene vr such that vr (r
n
2 ) = gr(r
n
2 ) where gr(r
n
2 ) = c1(r
n
2 ).
If rn2 < bp, there exists ep 2 bp; pf2  such that c1 (ep)  vr (ep)  c+1 (ep). Since rn+122 > pf2 , it follows
from Lemma A1(iii) that c1

rn+12
2

< vr

rn+12
2

and, therefore, gr

rn+12
2

< vr

rn+12
2

. From
Lemma A1(iv) follows that gr (p) < vr (p)8p > rn2 and gr (p) > vr (p)8p < rn2 . Similar, if rn2 >
bp, there exists ep < bp such that c1 (ep) = vr (ep). From Lemma A1(iii) follows that gr(ep) > vr (ep)
and, therefore, gr (p) < vr (p)8p > rn2 and gr (p) > vr (p)8p < rn2 . If rn2 = bp, there exists no
ep 6= bp such that c1 (ep) = vr (ep). Hence, c1 (p) < vr (p)8p 6= bp. Hence, gr  rn+122  < vr  rn+122 
and gr (p) < vr (p)8p > rn2 and gr (p) > vr (p)8p < rn2 . Applying Lemma A1(v) where gr
corresponds to g1 and va corresponds to g2 gives
kr
dr
< 0.
Applying Lemma A1(v) where gr corresponds to g1 and ga corresponds to g2 shows that
whenever an2   rn2 > 0 there exists 4 > 0 such that krdr > kada +4. From Lemma A1(ii) and the
denition of gr follows that r
n+1
2 = 2g
 1
r (1gr(r
n
2 )) = r
n
2 +
kr
dr
(1   2) and analogue for an+12 .
Hence, whenever rn2 2 I" and an2 2 I" we have an+12   rn+12 < an2   rn2   4(1   2). As shown
above, there exists n such that rn2 2 I", an2 2 I". Therefore, (an2 ) and (rn2 ) converge to the same
limit. Let p12 denote the limit, i.e., p
1
2 = r
1
2 = a
1
2 .
Since both (an2 ) and (r
n
2 ) converge to p
1
2 , it follows from Lemma 1 that it is conditionally dom-
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inated for player 2 to reject (accept) an o¤er with p2 > p12 (p2 < p
1
2 ). Hence, it is conditionally
dominated for player 1 to accept (reject) an o¤er where p1 < 1c1(p12 ) (p1 > 1c1(p
1
2 )). Since c1
is strictly -concave for all p 2
h
pN
2
  "; pN2 + "
i
, we have c01(p
1
2 ) < 0. Hence, it is conditionally
dominated for player 2 to o¤er p1 6= 1c1(pf ) and it is conditionally dominated for player 1 to
o¤er p2 6= p12 . Therefore, a unique strategy prole survives iterated conditional dominance.
Lemma 2 If 4t is constant and P s 2 P, then f( (P; ; b)) = f( (P s; 0; 0))+ s. For 4t not
constant, if P s 2 P 8 2 [; ] and if there exists " > 0 such that c1 is strictly -concave for all
p 2
h
pN
2
  "; pN2 + "
i
, then f( (P; ; b)) = f( (P s; 0; 0)) + s.
Proof. The relation tici(
t+1
j cj(pi)+ 
t+1
j + b
t+1
j )+ 
t
i + b
t
i
>
<pi describes the iteration process
for  (P; ; b). Note that bti and 
t
i depend on the delays, i.e. on Ht. Rewrite b
t
i as
  lnbi
 i ln
R1
0
(1 
te  it)h(t)dt and ti as
i
 i ln
 
1 + [te  itH(t)]10  
R1
0
te  ith(t)dt

. Then 
t
i+b
t
i
1 ti =
i lnbi
 i ln =
si 8t. Substituiting in the relation above gives tici(t+1j cj(pi)  t+1j sj + sj)  tisi ><pi   si. Let
u denote the rescaled value, ui = pi   si. Then the relation can be written as
ti
 
ci(
t+1
j [cj(ui + si)  sj ] + sj)  si

>
< ui
which is the same as tic
s
i (
t+1
j c
s
j(u))
>
<u. The limit of 
t
ici(
t+1
j cj(:::) + 
t+1
j + b
t+1
j ) + 
t
i + b
t
i is
the same as the limit of tic
s
i (
t+1
j c
s
j(:::)) + si. A payo¤ u in  (P
s; 0; 0) corresponds to payo¤ of p
in  (P; ; b) with p = u+ s. If P s 2 P (for 4t constant) or P s 2 P 8 2 [; ] and cs1 is strictly
-concave for all p 2 I" (if 4t not constant), then (rni ) and (ani ) of  (P s; 0; 0) converge to the
same limit (Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, respectively). Hence, (rni ) and (a
n
i ) of  (P; ; b) converge
to the same limit and the limits r1i = a
1
i of  (P; ; b) and  (P
s; 0; 0) di¤er by si. Hence, the set
of strategies that survive iterated conditional dominance di¤ers by the constant s.
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